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We study the general equilibrium properties of two growth models with overlapping
generations, habit formation, and endogenous fertility. In the neoclassical model, habits
modify the economy’s growth rate and generate transitional dynamics in fertility;
stationary income per capita is associated with either increasing or decreasing population
and output, depending on the strength of habits. In the AK specification, growing
population and increasing consumption per capita require that the habit coefficient lie
within definite boundaries; outside the critical interval, positive growth is associated with
either declining consumption due to overcrowding, or extinction paths with declining
population. In both frameworks, habits reduce fertility: the trade-off between
second-period consumption and spending for bequests prompts agents to decrease fertility
in order to make parental altruism less costly. This mechanism suggests that
status-dependent preferences may explain part of the decline in fertility rates observed in
most developed economies.
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1. INTRODUCTION
One of the major stylized facts that characterized the development process of
industrialized economies is the decline in fertility rates. In developed countries,
the transition from rapid population growth to low net fertility rates began with the
second phase of industrialization in the 19th century. Birth rates declined faster
than mortality rates, yielding a substantial reduction in net population growth—
a phenomenon labeled as the demographic transition. After World War II, net
fertility rates reached exceptionally low levels and fell short of the “replacement
threshold” even in countries where fertility had traditionally been high—e.g.,
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Spain and Italy.1 In less-developed countries, the fertility transition started in the
mid-1960s, and it was particularly rapid in East Asia.
In spite of institutional differences, demographic transitions regularly charac-
terized economic development throughout the industrialized world. The study of
the causal relations behind the fertility decline attracted the attention of several
economists, and the renewed interest in formal growth theories inspired a new body
of literature that analyzes endogenous population dynamics. Various explanations
for the demographic transition have been advanced. First, declining fertility rates
may be due to technological progress that—through its impact on the demand for
human capital—reverses the relationship between income and population growth
with respect to the regime of Malthusian stagnation [Galor and Weil (2000)].
Second, increasing real wages raise the opportunity cost of having children, and
lower fertility generates positive feedback effects on economic growth through
capital accumulation [Galor and Weil (1996)]. Third, there may be trade-offs
between the quality and quantity of children in parents’ desires, that introduce
a bias against quantity due to parents’ aspirations [Mulligan (1997)], the forces
of natural selection [Galor and Moav (2002)], increased longevity [Ehrlich and
Lui (1991)], or interactions between education choices and unobservable skills of
children [Becker (1991)]. Fourth, fertility decline may be associated with chang-
ing patterns in intergenerational transfers—the so-called Caldwell hypothesis
[Caldwell (1982)]. At low levels of economic development, the average family
size is large as transfers flow from the young to the old. In developed economies,
family size is small as the net transfer flow is from parents to children. The
idea that population dynamics are governed by the direction of transfers has been
formalized in a recent contribution by Blackburn and Cipriani (2005), who assume
that agents optimally choose the amount of transfers to both parents and children
and show that two-sided altruism generates development paths that are consistent
with the Caldwell hypothesis.
Empirical evidence and quantitative analyses suggest that each of these views
has its merits, though a monocausal explanation for (i) the low fertility rates
currently observed in developed countries and (ii) the demographic transition
experienced by most Western economies is unlikely to hold [see Mateos-Planas
(2002); Doepke (2005); Lagerlo¨f (2006)].2 The aim of this paper is not to challenge
previous explanations but rather to investigate an additional mechanism through
which fertility choices might have been affected by economic development. The
basic idea is that fertility choices interact with status-dependent preferences. In
particular, we argue that habit formation generates reallocation effects that help
explain the decline in fertility rates.
Most if not all theoretical models of fertility assume that intertemporal choices
are based on standard time-separable preferences defined over absolute consump-
tion levels. However, there is now a large consensus on the fact that preferences
are status- and time-dependent in reality. A growing body of empirical evidence
shows that economic agents form habits and tend to assess present satisfaction on
the basis of deviations from the standards of living enjoyed in the past [Osborn
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(1988); Fuhrer and Klein (1998); Fuhrer (2000); Guariglia and Rossi (2002)]. At
the theoretical level, a recent strand of literature investigates the effects of habits
on economic growth in general equilibrium models. In this framework, habit
formation—also labeled as “internal habits” or “inward-looking preferences”—
affects capital accumulation because agents make their savings decisions by com-
paring current consumption with a psychological benchmark, represented by a
weighted average of own past consumption levels [Caroll, Overland, and Weil
(1997); Alvarez-Cuadrado, Monteiro, and Turnovsky (2004)]. Quantitative appli-
cations suggest that status-dependent preferences may explain various stylized
facts—e.g., the hump-shaped time paths that characterized the behavior of saving
rates in Japan [Caroll (2000)] and Western Europe in the postwar period [Alvarez-
Cuadrado (2008)].
Recent contributions relax the traditional assumption of infinitely lived agents
and analyze the consequences of benchmark preferences in overlapping gener-
ations models in which consumers optimize over finite horizons. Abel (2005)
studies the effects of habits and social status on the allocation of consumption
across generations when agents are selfish. Alonso-Carrera, Caballe`, and Raurich
(2007) extend the model of dynastic altruism of de la Croix and Michel (1999) to
include habit formation and show that habits reduce the willingness of individuals
to leave bequests under exogenous population growth. This result hinges on a gen-
eral mechanism of reallocation in life-cycle resources that will be relevant to our
conclusions. In particular, we will formalize the idea that persistently low fertility
rates can be induced by status-dependent preferences because agents internalize
previous standards of living into their saving motives and fertility choices. This
reasoning may be linked to the observation that low-reproduction strategies—i.e.,
intentional choices aimed at preserving the family property and status—ceased to
be an exclusive feature of the aristocracy already in the 19th century, as the same
behavior gradually spread across the bourgeoisie, landowners, and other social
classes [Johansson (1987); Haines (1992)].
At the formal level, our analysis may be interpreted as an extended dynastic
model that includes both habit formation and endogenous fertility. In Section 2,
we study individual choices in an overlapping generations (OLG) economy, in
which the number of children provides utility in the first period of life and second-
period utility depends on the gap between current and previous consumption
levels. Agents are altruistic toward their descendants, and the opportunity cost of
fertility is determined by the amount of bequests that parents give to their chil-
dren. However, due to habit formation, consumption choices are biased in favor
of second-period consumption, and agents tend to reduce the share of resources
devoted to bequests. The consequence of this consumption bias is a reduction in
fertility rates: being able to choose the number of children, agents reduce fertility
in order to make parental altruism less costly. We investigate the implications for
economic growth and population dynamics under two technology specifications
that are standard in growth theory. Section 3 considers an AK model in which
the growth rate of aggregate output is independent of habits. In this framework,
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growing population and increasing consumption per capita require that the habit
coefficient lie within definite boundaries. Outside the critical interval, positive
growth is associated with either declining consumption due to overcrowding or
extinction paths with declining population. Section 4 assumes a neoclassical tech-
nology with constant returns to scale. Differently from the Ramsey model with
habit formation and exogenous population growth [Ryder and Heal (1973)], habits
modify the economy’s growth rate. Whereas the long-run equilibrium features
constant output per capita, the growth rate of aggregate output is determined by
the equilibrium rate of population growth—which is endogenous and modified by
habit formation. In the long run, stationary income per capita is associated with
either increasing or decreasing population and output, depending on the strength
of habits. We also simulate the transitional dynamics, showing that a declining
transitional path in fertility rates arises and is exclusively due to habit formation.
Section 5 discusses the connections between our results and previous literature,
and Section 6 concludes.
2. CONSUMPTION AND FERTILITY CHOICES
In each period, indexed by t , total population Nt consists of Not old agents and
N
y
t young agents. Young agents supply one unit of work time to firms and save,
whereas old agents earn capital income only as a result of previous savings. At
the end of period t , each young agent generates nt children who will become
productive workers in the subsequent period: Nyt+1 = Nyt nt . Total population at
time t +1 thus equals Nt+1 = Nyt (1+nt ), and the gross rate of population growth
is defined as
Nt+1
Nt
= nt−1
(
1 + nt
1 + nt−1
)
. (1)
As regards individual budget constraints, we allow for the presence of intergener-
ational transfers in the form of inter-vivos gifts, denoted by bt ≥ 0 and defined in
the father-to-son direction: if bequest motives are operative, each young agent in
period t receives bt units of output and, in turn, will transfer bt+1nt units of output
to his successors. The individual budget constraints thus read
ct = wt + bt − st , (2)
et+1 = rt+1st − bt+1nt , (3)
where c is consumption when young, e is consumption when old, w is the wage
rate, and r is gross interest on previous savings received during retirement. In gen-
eral, positive transfers (bt > 0) will arise whenever the degree of dynastic altruism
is sufficiently strong to make the bequest motive operative [Thibault (2000)]—
a circumstance that can be addressed after deriving the temporary equilibrium
of the economy.3 If bequests are operative in the equilibrium, we have bt > 0,
and the resulting equilibrium path exhibits many basic properties of Ramsey-type
equilibria in models with an infinitely lived representative agent, such as dynamic
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efficiency and policy neutrality; if bequests are not operative in the equilibrium
(bt = 0), expressions (2)–(3) reduce to the standard budget constraints of OLG
models with selfish agents a` la Diamond (1965).4 In this regard, our strategy will
be to study the characteristics of the equilibrium with bt > 0, and derive ex-post
existence conditions for an optimal path with positive bequests [see condition (28)
below].
Private welfare for each agent alive in (t, t + 1) equals
Wt = U (ct , et+1, nt ) + δWt+1,
where U (ct , et+1, nt ) represents direct utility provided by consumption levels and
the number of children and δ ∈ (0, 1) is the altruism factor, i.e., the weight put
by each agent on the welfare of each of the successors.5 Imposing the limiting
condition limj→∞ δj−tWj = 0, the dynastic utility function can be written as
W0 =
∞∑
j=0
δjU(cj , ej+1, nj ). (4)
Expression (4) is the typical objective function encountered in dynastic models,
where the degree of altruism, δ, is analogous to a discount factor imposed at
time zero over future generations’ direct utilities. As shown, e.g., by de la Croix
and Michel (2002: Chapter 5), the assumption of perfect foresight allows us to
reinterpret the sequence of individual optimization problems as a single infinite-
horizon problem. To analyze the interactions between habit formation and fertility
choices, direct utility will be specified as
U (ct , et+1, nt ) = u¯ (nt ) + u (ct ) + βv (et+1, ct ) ,
uc > 0, ucc ≤ 0, u¯n > 0, u¯nn ≤ 0, (5)
ve > 0, vee ≤ 0, and vc < 0.
The first element in (5) is a well-behaved utility function u¯ (nt ) where the fertility
rate appears as a normal good. Having children provides personal satisfaction, and
fertility rates are chosen in order to maximize private benefits. The way in which
we model fertility choices is thus standard in terms of preferences, but the cost
of raising children is specifically linked to our assumption of dynastic altruism.
A ceteris paribus increase in the number of children implies an increased cost in
terms of second-period gifts. Each agent will thus balance higher direct utility
with reduced consumption possibilities in the second period of life, in compliance
with the present-value budget constraint
bt+1nt = rt+1
[
wt + bt −
(
ct + et+1r−1t+1
)]
. (6)
As regards consumption preferences in (5), u (ct ) is direct utility from first-period
consumption, β > 0 is the individual time-preference factor, and v (et+1, ct )
embodies the second crucial assumption of our model, i.e., habit formation. More
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precisely, v (et+1, ct ) represents second-period utility from relative consumption:
for a given benchmark level enjoyed when young, ct , utility from consumption
when old increases with direct consumption (ve > 0, vee ≤ 0) but is lower the
higher is first-period consumption (vc < 0). In this regard we will follow the
standard specification of subtractive habits—see (15) below.
Under the assumption of perfect foresight, the solution to the dynastic problem
can be found by maximizing (4) subject to (6), using the sequences of consumption
levels and fertility rates as control variables. The associated Lagrangean at time t
is
Lt = U (ct , et+1, nt ) + δλt+1 rt+1
nt
[
wt + bt −
(
ct + et+1
rt+1
)]
− λtbt , (7)
where λ represents the dynamic multiplier attached to the individual budget con-
straint. The optimality conditions of the consumer’s problem read
Lct = 0 → (uct + βvct )nt = δλt+1rt+1, (8)
Lnt = 0 → u¯nt n2t = δλt+1rt+1
[
wt + bt −
(
ct + et+1r−1t+1
)]
, (9)
Let+1 = 0 → βvet+1nt = δλt+1, (10)
Lbt = 0 → δλt+1rt+1 = λtnt . (11)
The crucial conditions linking consumption and fertility choices are thus summa-
rized by
λt = uct + βvct = βvet+1rt+1, (12)
u¯nt = λtbt+1r−1t+1. (13)
Expression (12) is the Euler condition for consumption allocation, affected by
the presence of habits (vct > 0). Expression (13) characterizes optimal fertility
choices and asserts that the marginal cost of bequests—discounted by the pre-
vailing interest rate—must equal the marginal benefit from having children, u¯n.
Notice that, in order to interpret bt as “bequest,” we should impose a nonnegativity
constraint bt ≥ 0 in each period. For the sake of clarity, we will concentrate on the
characteristics of interior solutions without specifying further constraints ex ante.
Because the main results are derived while assuming specific functional forms,
the nonnegativity of bequests will be addressed by checking, ex post, under what
conditions parameters are compatible with positive gifts along the optimal path.6
Let us assume the following specifications:
u (ct ) = log ct , (14)
v (et+1, ct ) = log (et+1 − εct ) , ε > 0, (15)
u¯ (nt ) = γ nσt , 0 < σ < 1, (16)
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where γ > 0 is a weighting parameter for fertility preferences. Expression (15)
specifies habit formation according to the “subtractive form” [Alonso-Carrera et al.
(2007)], which postulates a precise willingness to overcome previous consumption
levels: the higher is ε the stronger is the role of habits in second-period consumption
choices. Expression (16) assumes positive but decreasing marginal utility from
the number of children.7 As shown in the following sections, assumptions (14)–
(16) allow us to obtain closed-form solutions in the presence of linear returns
to aggregate capital and ensure analytical tractability while studying long-run
equilibria under neoclassical technologies. We will later argue (Section 4.2) that
logarithmic additivity in U(ct , et+1, nt ) may increase the generality of our results
by ruling out ad hoc complementarities between consumption and fertility in
individual preferences.
From (14)–(16), the optimality condition (12) implies the modified Euler equa-
tion
et+1 = ct [βrt+1 + ε (1 + β)] , (17)
according to which, for a given interest rate, the ratio between second- and first-
period consumption is higher the stronger is the degree of habit formation. As may
be construed, the bias in favor of second-period consumption generates realloca-
tion effects that modify optimal fertility choices. Studying these interactions, and
their consequences for economic development, is the central aim of our analysis.
Because technological specifications matter for the nature of the results, we will
consider two central paradigms in growth theory, i.e., neoclassical technologies
with constant returns to scale versus constant marginal returns to aggregate cap-
ital. For the sake of exposition, we begin by considering a simple AK model of
endogenous growth.
3. HABITS, FERTILITY, AND ENDOGENOUS GROWTH
This section analyzes the competitive equilibrium of a decentralized economy
under laissez-faire. Consumption and saving choices are characterized by the
optimality conditions described in Section 2, whereas the production sector is
represented by profit-maximizing firms. To analyze situations with linear returns to
aggregate capital, we consider Romer’s (1989) specification of learning by doing.
There exist J identical firms, indexed by j , producing y˜(j) units of final good by
employing ˜k(j) units of capital and (j) units of labor. Each firm’s technology is
represented by
y˜(j) = ( ˜k(j))µ
(
h(j)(j)
)1−µ
, (18)
where h(j) represents workers’ ability and is taken as given by every agent in the
economy. In the competitive equilibrium, factor prices thus equal marginal pro-
ductivities defined at given ability levels. Because firms are of identical size, they
employ identical amounts of inputs and produce the same output level, y˜(j) = y˜.
Aggregate output Y = J y˜ equals Y = KµL1−µ, where K = J ˜k is aggregate cap-
ital and L = hJ = hNy is aggregate efficient labor (recall that labor is supplied
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by the young cohort only). The engine of growth is knowledge accumulation due
to learning by doing. Following Romer (1989), workers’ knowledge is affected by
an aggregated externality: h is positively related to the capital stock per worker,
kt ≡ Kt/Nyt , according to the linear relation
ht = φkt = φ
(
Kt/N
y
t
)
,
where the constantφ > 0 represents the intensity of learning by doing. Substituting
this relation in the aggregate production function, we obtain Yt = AKt , where the
(gross) marginal social return from capital, A ≡ φ1−µ, is constant over time. The
gross marginal private return from capital equals the equilibrium interest factor
rt = µA < A, (19)
which is constant over time. Because the equilibrium wage rate reads
wt = (1 − µ)
(
Yt/N
y
t
)
, (20)
we can substitute (19) and Kt+1 = Nyt st in (2)–(3) to obtain the aggregate resource
constraint of the economy,
Kt+1 = AKt − Ct − Et, (21)
where Ct ≡ Nyt ct and Et = Not et represent aggregate consumption of young
and old agents, respectively. Exploiting (14)–(16), individual consumption and
fertility choices imply the following (all proofs are in the Appendix).
LEMMA 1. In an interior solution, aggregate consumption of both cohorts
grows at the same constant rate
Ct+1/Ct = Et+1/Et = δµA (22)
in each period t = 0, . . . ,∞, and the share consumed when old is higher the
stronger is habit formation:
Ct
Et
= δµA
µAβ + ε + εβ . (23)
Expression (23) embodies the reallocation effect induced by habit formation. A
higher ε corresponds to a stronger willingness to postpone consumption in order
to overcome historical standards of living and results in higher shares of output
consumed by old agents in each period. Expression (22) is conceptually analogous
to the Keynes–Ramsey rule and suggests that a typical balanced growth equilibrium
arises in the economy, at least in terms of aggregate variables. We use italics in
order to stress that positive net growth in aggregate output is not necessarily
associated with a continuous rise in individual consumption: equilibrium fertility
rates generally differ from output growth rates, so that declining per capita incomes
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due to excessive birth rates—or increasing per capita incomes induced by declining
population—are not remote possibilities. This point will be addressed immediately
after the necessary proof of knife-edge balanced growth:
LEMMA 2. In an interior solution, the consumption-output share of the young
equals
ψ ≡ Ct
Yt
= (1 − δµ) δµA
µA (β + δ) + ε (1 + β) (24)
in each period, and the economy exhibits a balanced growth path with
Kt+1/Kt = Yt+1/Yt = δµA (25)
in each period t = 0, . . . ,∞.
An important consequence of knife-edge balanced growth is that individual
bequests grow at the same rate as individual consumption. In particular, the effect
of habit formation is to reduce equilibrium bequests relative to first-period con-
sumption. To see this formally, define zt ≡ bt/ct , and rewrite the lifetime budget
constraint (6) as (see Appendix)
zt+1 = 1
δ
zt + 1
δ
[
1 − µ
ψ
− (µA + ε) (1 + β)
µA
]
. (26)
Because δ < 1, it follows from (26) that, if a steady-state zss > 0 exists, the
bequest-consumption ratio jumps at this stationary level at t = 0 and is constant
thereafter. Imposing stationarity in (26), we obtain
zss = 11 − δ
[
(µA + ε) (1 + β)
µA
− 1 − µ
ψ
]
. (27)
Expression (27) implies that bequests are operative (zss > 0) only if the term in
square brackets is positive. From (24), this requires
1 − µ
(1 − δµ) δ <
µA + ε + β (µA + ε)
µAδ + ε + β (µA + ε) . (28)
Satisfying the above inequality is a necessary condition to have interior solutions to
the dynastic problem. We thus restrict our attention to combinations of parameters
that satisfy (28). Recalling that ψ depends on ε, expression (27) implies that an
increase in the strength of habits would reduce equilibrium bequests relative to
first-period individual consumption: in line with the results of Alonso-Carrera
et al. (2007), we have8
∂zss
∂ε
=
(
1
1 − δ
)(
1 + β
µA
)[
1 − 1
(1 − δµ) δ
]
< 0. (29)
We now have all the elements to analyze equilibrium fertility rates. The following
propositions show that (i) the equilibrium fertility rate is negatively related to the
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strength of habits and (ii) positive population growth is compatible with increasing
per capita incomes only if the degree of habit formation falls within a precise range
of values.
PROPOSITION 1. Along the equilibrium path, the equilibrium fertility rate is
constant: population grows at the equilibrium rate
nss =
[
zss
δµA
γσ (µA + ε)
] 1
σ
, (30)
with ∂nss/∂ε < 0 (stronger habits reduce population growth).
Proposition 1 and expression (29) imply that habit formation has intergenera-
tional impact along two distinct dimensions: stronger habits (i) reduce the share of
expenditures devoted to bequests and (ii) reduce population growth. These results
have an intuitive interpretation. Habits induce a bias in intertemporal choices that
produces a reallocation in favor of second-period consumption. Given the trade-
off between second-period consumption and bequests, agents are made more
“egotistical” by stronger habits—in the sense that they will reduce fertility rates
in order to make parental altruism less costly.
A peculiar feature of this model is that habit formation does not modify the
growth rate of aggregate output, whereas it determines fertility rates. This implies
that habits modify the dynamics of individual incomes, leaving output growth
unaffected at the economy level. In particular, positive growth in aggregate output
is not necessarily associated with growing population and increasing consumption
per capita. As shown below, this situation arises only if ε lies within definite
boundaries.
PROPOSITION 2. Assume that parameters are compatible with positive
growth in aggregate output and positive bequests (δµA > 1 and zss > 0). There
generally exist a couple of critical levels ε′ and ε′′, with ε′ < ε′′, such that ε = ε′
implies nss = δµA > 1 and ε = ε′′ implies nss = 1. As a consequence, we may
have three cases:
i. (Extinction path) if ε > ε′′ population declines and per capita incomes grow faster
than aggregate output;
ii. (Overcrowding) if ε < ε′ population grows faster than aggregate output, implying
declining per capita incomes;
iii. (Non-degenerate growth) if ε′ < ε < ε′′, aggregate output, per capita incomes, and
population increase over time.
Proposition 2 directly follows from ∂nss/∂ε < 0, and draws a clear-cut distinc-
tion between the dynamics of aggregate versus per capita variables. In case (i),
habits are very strong and consumption per capita grows faster than aggregate out-
put. The excessive willingness to consume prompts agents to choose low fertility
rates, associated with declining population, nss < 1. In the opposite situation—
case (ii)—habits are very weak and fertility rates are too high to guarantee sustained
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FIGURE 1. Dynamics of population and individual consumption (first period) for different
values of ε. Parameter values are β = 0.75, γ = δ = σ = 0.5, and µ = 0.6. Nondegenerate
growth arises in all paths falling in the gray-shaded areas delimited by the critical values ε′
and ε′′.
consumption standards for future generations: the gross rate of population growth
exceeds δµA, and individual incomes decline over time. The bottom line is that
positive growth in aggregate output is associated with a growing population and
increasing per capita incomes if and only if the coefficient of habit formation falls
within definite boundaries—i.e., the case of “nondegenerate growth” arising when
ε′ < ε < ε′′. Numerical substitutions suggest that fertility rates are quite sensitive
to the coefficient of habit formation: in the example reported in Figure 1, the values
for ε delimiting nondegenerate growth are ε′ = 3.24% and ε′′ = 4.89%. If the
coefficient of habit formation lies outside this interval, overcrowding or extinction
paths immediately arise.9
The above results are useful in clarifying the negative impact of habits on
equilibrium fertility rates. The knife-edge character of the balanced-growth path
clearly hinges on the assumption of linear returns, and a fixed interest rate makes
the economy’s growth rate independent of population growth. Results change in
the neoclassical model, in which decreasing marginal returns to capital imply that
accumulation rates, and therefore economic growth, are crucially determined by
fertility rates. This implies that habit formation modifies the economy’s growth
rate both in the short and in the long run, as shown below.
4. HABITS, FERTILITY, AND NEOCLASSICAL GROWTH
The neoclassical specification is easily obtained by ruling out learning by doing
from the previous model. Assuming that h is a fixed constant in firms’ technologies
(18), we can define a constant proportionality factor H = h1−µ and rewrite
aggregate output according to the standard Cobb–Douglas form
Yt = HKµt
(
N
y
t
)1−µ
, (31)
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where K now exhibits decreasing marginal returns. In terms of capital per worker,
kt ≡ Kt/Nyt , the intensive-form technology reads yt = f (kt ) = Hkµt , and
equilibrium rates of reward equal
rt = f ′ (kt ) = µHkµ−1t and wt = (1 − µ) f (kt ). (32)
The aggregate constraint of the economy and the first-order conditions imply the
following dynamic relations:
ntkt+1 = f (kt ) − ct − (et/nt−1) , (33)
et+1 = ct [βf ′ (kt+1) + ε (1 + β)], (34)
λtnt = λt+1δf ′ (kt+1) , (35)
nσt+1 =
1
δ
nσt +
1
σγ
[(1 − µ) f (kt+1) λt+1 − (1 + β)] , (36)
λtct = f ′ (kt+1) [f ′ (kt+1) + ε]−1. (37)
Expression (33) is the aggregate constraint of the economy in terms of capital per
worker; equations (34)–(35) are the optimality conditions (17) and (11); expres-
sions (36)–(37) are derived in the Appendix and characterize the joint dynamics
of shadow prices and fertility rates along the optimal path. We begin our analysis
by studying the characteristics of the steady-state equilibrium. Subsequently, we
validate the usual interpretation of the steady-state equilibrium as the long-run
equilibrium of the economy by means of a numerical simulation that analyzes
transitional dynamics (Section 4.2).
4.1. Steady-State analysis
Imposing steady-state conditions in system (33)–(37), and denoting by subscript
∗ stationary values, we obtain
n∗k∗ = f (k∗) − c∗ − (e∗/n∗) , (38)
e∗ = c∗[βf ′ (k∗) + ε (1 + β)], (39)
f ′ (k∗) = n∗/δ, (40)
nσ∗ =
1
δ
nσ∗ +
1
σγ
[(1 − µ) f (k∗) λ∗ − (1 + β)] , (41)
c∗λ∗ = f ′ (k∗) [f ′ (k∗) + ε]−1, (42)
which is a system of five equations in five unknowns (n∗, k∗, c∗, e∗, λ∗). As shown
in the Appendix, the equilibrium condition determining the stationary fertility rate
can be written as
ga (n∗) = gb (n∗) , (43)
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where
ga (n∗) = nσ∗ , (44)
gb (n∗) = δ (1 + β)
σγ (1 − δ) −
(1 − µ)
σγ (1 − δ) (1 − µδ)
[
n∗ (δ + β) + εδ (1 + β)
n∗ + δε
]
.
(45)
The equilibrium can be characterized by studying the properties of (44) and (45).
We will label as “well-defined” the equilibria associated with n∗ > 0 and as
“feasible” only those implying n∗ > δ. The reason for the latter restriction is that,
from (40), a candidate equilibrium with n∗ < δ would imply f ′ (k∗) < 1—that is,
negative net rents from capital. It is instructive to begin with the case of nonexistent
habits.
PROPOSITION 3. If habits are inactive, ε = 0, the steady-state equilibrium is
unique.
Proposition 3 is described in Figure 2, which represents the equilibrium condi-
tion (43) in the gi −n∗ plane. When ε = 0, function gb (n∗) reduces to a horizontal
straight line. Because ga (n∗) is strictly increasing and ga (0) = 0, there can be
only one intersection, associated with condition (43). The resulting equilibrium
is well-defined and feasible provided that parameters are such that n∗ > δ (see
Appendix).
Introducing habit formation, ε > 0, function gb (n∗) becomes increasing and
concave: from (45), we have
∂gb (n∗)
∂n∗
= εδ (1 − µ)
σγ (1 − µδ) (n∗ + εδ)2
> 0,
∂2gb (n∗)
∂n2∗
= − 2εδ (1 − µ)
σγ (1 − µδ) (n∗ + εδ)3
< 0.
In this case, the equilibrium can be characterized as follows. Two important
properties of gb (n∗) are that
∂gb (n∗)
∂ε
= − n∗ (1 − µ)
γ σ (1 − µδ) (n∗ + εδ)2
< 0, (46)
lim
n∗→∞
gb (n∗)
∣∣∣
ε>0
= lim
ε→0
gb (n∗) . (47)
Expression (46) implies that a ceteris paribus increase in ε moves gb (n∗) southwest
in the gi − n∗ plane. Expression (47) follows from (45) and asserts that gb (n∗)
is asymptotically horizontal and bounded from above by the value associated
with inactive habits, limε→0 gb (n∗). These results imply that, starting from the
case of inactive habits, subsequent increases in ε generate downward shifts in
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FIGURE 2. Long-run equilibria in the neoclassical model for different values of ε. Diagram
(a): unique intersections ga = gb and feasible equilibria. Diagram (b): multiple intersections
ga = gb and unique feasible equilibria.
the gb (n∗) function for any positive fertility rate. Because ga (n∗) is increasing
and independent of habits, all intersections satisfying the equilibrium condition
ga = gb will necessarily be associated with lower fertility rates with respect to
the case ε = 0. This result is described in the left graphs of Figure 2, where the
highest equilibrium fertility rate is the habit-free value, denoted as nmax.
As both ga (n∗) and gb (n∗) are concave, we may have either one or multiple
intersections satisfying (43), depending on the constellation of parameters. How-
ever, the existence of multiple intersections does not imply multiple equilibria, as
shown in the following.
PROPOSITION 4. For any ε < 1, there may exist only one feasible steady
state. This equilibrium is characterized by an intersection in which gb (n∗) cuts
ga (n∗) from above.
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is described in graphical terms in Figure
2. As shown in the Appendix, we may have two cases. When µ > (1 + δ)−1, we
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may have only one intersection ga = gb, and this equilibrium is characterized
by gb (n∗) cutting ga (n∗) from above. This case is reported in Figure 2, diagram
(a). When µ < (1 + δ)−1, the vertical intercept of gb (n∗) is negative, and
condition ga = gb can be satisfied by two intersections denoted by n′ and n′′, with
n′ < n′′. This situation arises in Figure 2, diagram (b), with ε = 0.15. The “high”
intersectionn′′ has the same properties as the unique equilibrium arising in diagram
(a). The “low” intersection n′, instead, satisfies the condition ga = gb with gb (n∗)
cutting ga (n∗) from below. However, the low intersection cannot be a feasible
equilibrium because the feasibility condition n′ > δ is necessarily violated (see
Appendix). As a consequence, a feasible steady state is exclusively characterized
by an intersection in which gb (n∗) cuts ga (n∗) from above: this is the only
possible equilibrium in case (a) and the only feasible equilibrium, n′′, in case (b) of
Figure 2.
This characterization of feasible equilibria has three main implications. First,
a ceteris paribus increase in the strength of habits reduces the optimal fertility
rate in any feasible steady state. As shown in the left graphs of Figure 2, gb
shifts downward following an increase in ε, and the equilibrium fertility rate
consequently shrinks.
Second, whenever a feasible equilibrium exists without habits, there is always
a range of positive values of ε for which feasible equilibria also exist with habit
formation. In fact, if nmax > δ, it is always possible to define a critical value of
habit formation εδ > 0 such that ε = εδ implies an equilibrium with n∗ = δ. This
critical level can be calculated by imposing n∗ = δ in condition (43) to obtain
εδ = (1 − µδ)[δ(1 + β) − δ
σ σγ (1 − δ)] − (1 − µ)(δ + β)
(1 − µδ)[δσ σγ (1 − δ) − δ(1 + β)] + (1 + β)(1 − µ) . (48)
Given Proposition 3 and result (46), any value of ε exceeding εδ would generate
equilibria that violate feasibility (n∗ < δ), whereas any degree of habit formation
falling within the interval ε ∈ (0, εδ) yields feasible steady-state equilibria. This
is the range of values of ε that is relevant for studying the long-run behavior of the
system. In graphical terms, the “relevant region” is represented by the gray-shaded
areas in the right graphs of Figure 2.
Third, if parameters allow for positive population growth when habits are in-
active, there always exists a critical degree of habit formation associated with
constant population, and a subset of feasible equilibria where population declines
due to the presence of habits:
LEMMA 3. Provided that nmax > 1, there exists a critical value ε¯ < εδ such
that ε = ε¯ implies n∗ = 1. Hence, the set of feasible equilibria with ε > 0 includes
two subsets of equilibria respectively associated with n∗ > 1 and n∗ < 1.
The intuition behind Lemma 3 is that, because δ < 1, the special case of constant
population n∗ = 1 > δ lies in the interior of the relevant region; see Figure 2.
The consequence is that different degrees of habit persistence determine whether
long-run population growth rates will be positive or negative. On the one hand,
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this result looks similar to that found in the AK model: strong habit persistence
may imply declining population. On the other hand, the assumption of decreasing
returns to capital yields quite different implications for the economy’s growth rate.
In the stationary equilibrium of the neoclassical model, consumption and capital
per worker are constant, and aggregate output grows at the same rate as population.
Formally, because f ′ (k∗) = µHkµ−1∗ , condition (40) reads
k∗ =
(
µδH
n∗
) 1
1−µ
, (49)
and implies that Kt+1/Kt = Nt+1/Nt = Yt+1/Yt = n∗ in this equilibrium. Hence,
habit formation modifies the economy’s growth rate through the fertility rate. This
is an important difference with respect to previous literature on habit formation (see
Section 5) and also with respect to the AK model of Section 3. The characteristics
of the neoclassical equilibrium are summarized in the following.
PROPOSITION 5. Provided that nmax > 1, we may have three cases: (i) if
0 < ε < ε¯, the steady-state equilibrium features increasing output and population;
(ii) if ε¯ < ε < εδ , the steady-state equilibrium features declining output and
population; (iii) if ε = ε¯, the steady-state equilibrium features constant output
and population.
Proposition 5 can be interpreted as follows. Households internalize the effect
of habits in their bequest and saving motives, reducing fertility in order to make
parental altruism less costly. However, in a neoclassical world, fertility determines
the economy’s growth rate, which remains strictly positive if and only if habits
are relatively weak, ε < ε¯. Excessive habit formation, ε > ε¯, induces long-
run equilibria in which constant per capita incomes are associated with falling
population and declining aggregate output.
4.2. Equilibrium Dynamics
The preceding Section postulates the usual interpretation of the steady-state equi-
librium as the long-run equilibrium of the economy. Two questions that still have
to be addressed relate to the dynamic stability of the stationary equilibrium and
the effects of habit formation on transitional dynamics. The starting point of
the analysis is a three-by-three dynamic system that is obtained from suitable
substitutions in (33)–(37). As shown in the Appendix, the dynamic behavior of
the economy is fully determined by three equations involving the crucial variables
k, λ, and n:
kt+1 = 1
nt
[
f (kt ) − f
′(kt+1)
λt (f ′(kt+1) + ε) −
βf ′(kt+1) + ε(1 + β)
λtδ(f ′(kt+1) + ε)
]
, (50)
λt+1 = λtnt
δf ′(kt+1)
, (51)
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nt+1 =
[
1
δ
nσt +
1
σγ
[(1 − µ) f (kt+1) λt+1 − (1 + β)]
]1/σ
. (52)
From (50)–(52), the evolution of capital per capita depends on the expected interest
rate, and the dynamics of kt+1 are implicitly determined by equation (50) for a
given set of parameters {µ,H, γ, σ, β, δ, ε}.10 As before, it is instructive to begin
with the case of inactive habits. In this case, it is possible to show analytically that
ε = 0 implies no transition in fertility rates.
PROPOSITION 6. When habits are inactive, the fertility rate is constant at
each point in time along the optimal path.
The intuition behind Proposition 6 is provided by the equilibrium condition for
consumption allocation (see Appendix),
Ct
Et
= δ (rt + ε) rt+1
(rt+1 + ε) [βrt + ε (1 + β)] . (53)
Expression (53) shows that the shares of output going to young and old agents are
generally time-varying, as they depend on capital accumulation. Setting ε = 0,
however, expression (53) reduces to Ct/Et = δ/β. Proposition 6 can thus be inter-
preted as follows: in the presence of habits, the allocation of output among cohorts
varies over time because individual choices adjust to changing standards of living
during the development process. Because the number of children is determined by
utility maximization, this mechanism characterizes both consumption and fertility
choices. Without habits, output allocation is time-invariant as no adjustment in
consumption, or in fertility rates, is called for by changing standards of living.
In general, the presence of habits yields transitional variations in fertility rates.
Given the complexity of the dynamic system (50)–(52), this issue can be addressed
only numerically. As a first step, we considered several different constellations of
parameters, and derived the respective eigenvalues from the Jacobian matrix. In this
regard, numerical results show that system (50)–(52) exhibits saddle-point stability
for a wide range of parameter values, with one stable and two unstable eigenvalues.
As a second step, we performed a numerical simulation of the full dynamics
of the economy along the optimal path, with a special focus on the transitional
impact of habits on fertility decisions. To circumvent the disadvantages of methods
based on linearization, we used backward iteration to characterize approximate
solutions to the Euler equations [Strulik and Brunner (2002); Heer and Maussner
(2005); see Appendix for details]. As noted above (note 10), the dynamics of
kt+1 are implicitly determined by equation (50) for a given set of parameters
{µ,H, γ, σ, β, δ, ε} and determine the respective entries in the Jacobian matrix of
the system by applying the implicit-function theorem. As a benchmark case, we
specify the set of parameters as
µ = 0.36, H = 10, γ = 0.12, σ = 0.5, β = 0.935, δ = 0.93, ε = 0.015,
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which implies, in light of (38)–(42), the steady-state values
c∗ = 6.24008, e∗ = 6.84885, n∗ = 1.06281, b∗ = 0.42048,
k∗ = 6.0066, λ∗ = 0.15817.
The Jacobian of (50)–(52) evaluated at the steady-state, ¯J∗, is equal to
J∗ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂kt+1
∂kt
∣∣∣∣
∗
∂kt+1
∂λt
∣∣∣∣
∗
∂kt+1
∂nt
∣∣∣∣
∗
∂λt+1
∂kt
∣∣∣∣
∗
∂λt+1
∂λt
∣∣∣∣
∗
∂λt+1
∂nt
∣∣∣∣
∗
∂nt+1
∂kt
∣∣∣∣
∗
∂nt+1
∂λt
∣∣∣∣
∗
∂nt+1
∂nt
∣∣∣∣
∗
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1.075268818 76.06568876 −5.697822964
0.018122124 2.281978849 0.0528000960
11.87479223 1259.405296 0.5652977844
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ,
and the associated eigenvalues read
ν =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2.39907513941288996
1.07526893420792736
0.44820137777951952
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
With two unstable eigenvalues (ν1, ν2 > 1) and one real stable eigenvalue (ν3 < 1),
the dynamic system (50)–(52) exhibits saddle-point stability with monotone con-
vergence. The results of the numerical exercises are presented in Figures 3 and 4.
We analyze the effect of habits by considering three scenarios: (i) ε = 0,
represented by the solid line; (ii) ε = 1%, dashed line; and (iii) ε = 1.5%, dotted
line. Looking at Figure 3, it becomes apparent that habits do not play an important
role in very early stages of economic development. As the economy becomes
richer, parents internalize the existence of habits in their bequest and fertility
choices, and the effects of habit formation become relevant. Because agents tend
to allocate more resources in favor of second-period consumption, savings increase
with the strength of habits, thereby fueling capital accumulation. To reduce the
private cost of having children, agents choose lower fertility rates for higher values
of the habit coefficient. The bequest-consumption ratio, represented by zt = bt/ct ,
is declining over time when habits are active, and the long-run value is inversely
related to the degree of habit persistence. This result confirms the intuition behind
the reallocation effects induced by habit formation and is in line with our previous
conclusions in the AK model—see expression (29) in Section 3.11
Figure 4 embodies two results. First, by virtue of the mechanism mentioned
above, fertility rates decline during the transition, i.e., net population growth
rates are progressively reduced by economic development. Second, the simulation
confirms Proposition 6, by which fertility rates are constant during the transition
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FIGURE 3. Transitional dynamics of capital per capita kt , first-period consumption ct , and
bequest-consumption ratio zt = bt/ct .
when ε = 0. In other words, the “demographic transition” depicted in Figure 4 is
exclusively due to habit formation.
It should be stressed that the assumption of logarithmic preferences in con-
sumption is relevant for Proposition 6. If consumption preferences display an
elasticity of intertemporal substitution different from unity, the allocation of con-
sumption over the life cycle is affected by interest rates, independently of the
presence of habits. In this case, consumption shares are generally time-varying in
the short run, and fertility rates likely exhibit transitional dynamics even without
habits. Hence, the transitional effects of habits on fertility would interact with
those stemming from nonlogarithmic preferences. However, our long-run results
should remain valid even with other types of preferences. The reason is that the
reallocation effect—i.e., the fact that habits reduce the share of resources devoted
to bequests—is a general mechanism that does not hinge on logarithmic forms.
As shown by Alonso-Carrera et al. (2007), who assume exogenous population
growth, habits make the operativeness of bequests less likely even with generic
additive preferences. Building on this mechanism, the peculiar result of our model
remains: given the possibility of modifying the fertility rate, agents are able to
reduce the total cost of bequests by decreasing the number of children. In this re-
spect, notice that our assumption of logarithmic preferences may increase, rather
than limit, the generality of our conclusions. The reason is that, in both the AK and
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FIGURE 4. Transitional dynamics of fertility rates for increasing strength of habits.
the neoclassical model presented above, the negative long-run impact of habits
arises without making ad hoc assumptions of complementarity, or substitutability,
between consumption and fertility in individual preferences.
5. CONNECTIONS WITH PREVIOUS LITERATURE
With respect to previous literature on demographic transition, the main distinctive
feature of our analysis is given by our main result: habit formation—and, in
general, status-dependent preferences—may constitute an important part of the
explanations for the decline of fertility rates exhibited by developed economies.
To our knowledge, previous studies did not address this issue. The old-age security
approach postulates that present fertility choices are driven by the expectation that
children will provide support to their parents in the future, so that variations
in equilibrium fertility rates are determined by uncertainty over future incomes
[Nishimura and Zhang (1995)] and linked to the degree of risk aversion [Sah
(1991)]. In the standard framework in which children provide direct utility to
their parents, the fertility decline may be due to increased productivity from tech-
nological progress [Galor and Weil (2000)], rising real wages that increase the
opportunity cost of having children [Galor and Weil (1996)], and possible trade-
offs between the quality and quantity of children [Becker (1991)]. In this regard,
we may stress that our results do not hinge on interactions between the opportunity
cost of fertility and technological development. In the present analysis, the central
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element is the psychological cost of having children: low fertility rates originate
in the distorted perception of “joy from consumption” that old agents have in
the second period of life. Our reasoning also differs from explanations based on
quality–quantity trade-offs. If parents reduce the number of children in order to
provide better education to each successor, the roots of low fertility rates are to
be found in parental altruism, whereas our analysis suggests the conclusion—
perhaps less pleasant, but worth considering—that the source of low fertility rates
is parental “egotism” induced by habits. From a broader perspective, the present
analysis seems complementary to the related literature on Malthusian stagnation
and demographic transition—e.g., Galor and Weil (2000) and Boldrin and Jones
(2002). These contributions explicitly model the rise and overlap of different
phases of development and characterize demographic transitions by considering
the interactions between fertility, factor availability, and technology improvements.
As we have emphasized the interactions between fertility and preferences, extend-
ing the present analysis to include technological transitions seems an interesting
topic for future research.
The central role of bequests in our results suggests some similarities between
our approach and that followed by Blackburn and Cipriani (2005), who argue that
population dynamics are crucially governed by the direction of intergenerational
transfers. Blackburn and Cipriani (2005) assume two-sided altruism in a model that
generates development paths consistent with the Caldwell hypothesis [Caldwell
(1982)]: low development is associated with young-to-old transfers and large fam-
ily size, whereas high-development phases feature lower fertility and old-to-young
transfers. With respect to Blackburn and Cipriani (2005), our analysis is different
in both aims and means. At the formal level, the models differ in two important
ways. First, we rule out two-sided altruism and focus on equilibrium paths with
operative bequests—that is, transfers are “father-to-son” by construction. Second,
habits are not considered in Blackburn and Cipriani (2005), whereas they represent
the central feature of our analysis. At the conceptual level, our aim is different.
Blackburn and Cipriani (2005) formalize the Caldwell hypothesis and reproduce
the demographic transition along these lines by considering possible switch overs
in the direction of transfers. In this paper, we asked whether persistently low
fertility rates can also be explained by time-dependent preferences, arguing that
the stage of development affects population growth because agents internalize
previous standards of living into their bequest motives and fertility choices. Our
reasoning is referred to the empirical evidence on the intertemporal behavior of
consumers and is also consistent with less-recent historical facts. In the 18th
century, the aristocracy pursued low-reproduction strategies in order to avoid the
partition of the family property and maintain family status [Johansson (1987)]. In
the 19th century, similar strategies were intentionally adopted by the bourgeoisie
and landowners, gradually spreading across other social classes (Haines, 1992).
With respect to the literature on habit formation and economic growth, we can
make four remarks. The first comment relates to the neoclassical model. In their
seminal paper, Ryder and Heal (1973) show that habits do not modify the long-run
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equilibrium of the economy, as the Ramsey model with infinite horizons predicts
convergence toward the usual “modified golden rule.” In Section 4, we have shown
that habit formation modifies the long-run growth rate of the economy instead. The
reason for our result is not the assumption of finite lifetimes,12 but rather that of
endogenous fertility: habits matter because they affect the equilibrium fertility rate
and thereby the growth rate of aggregate output in any equilibrium with stationary
income per capita. This result can be seen in parallel with that of Alvarez-Cuadrado
et al. (2004), which asserts that habit formation becomes relevant for long-run
growth when production possibilities are improved by exogenous productivity
growth in the Ramsey model.
The second remark is related to the AK framework. Carrol et al. (1997) studied
the role of habits in the standard AK model with exogenous fertility, showing
that the degree of habit formation affects the long-run growth rate of the econ-
omy if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution differs from unity [Carrol et al.
(1997), equations (17)–(19), p. 345]. The logarithmic case thus yields no growth
effects of habits in the representative-agent framework—and this is also the case
in our OLG model of Section 3, where the growth rate in aggregate variables,
δµA, is independent of the degree of habit formation, ε. Specifying nonloga-
rithmic preferences in our AK model would reintroduce a missing link between
habits and growth in aggregate variables. However, the aim of Section 3 is to
emphasize the peculiar role of endogenous fertility and habit formation in de-
termining fundamental changes in the growth rate of per capita variables. The
assumption of logarithmic preferences allows us to study the various cases—i.e.,
extinction, overcrowding, and nondegenerate growth in Proposition 1—in isolation
from transitional dynamics and elasticity-induced growth effects a` la Carrol et al.
(1997).
The third remark is related to models with overlapping generations. A compa-
rable framework is that employed by Alonso-Carrera et al. (2007), who study a
three-period OLG model with habit formation and inherited tastes. As we pointed
out in Section 4.2, one of the results of Alonso-Carrera et al. (2007) can be iden-
tified with the first logical step of our reasoning: habits tend to contrast dynastic
altruism. Differently from Alonso-Carrera et al. (2007)—who assume exogenous
population growth—our model features endogenous fertility, which allows us to
show that habits contrast population growth because habit formation prompts
agents to reduce the cost of parental altruism in the second period of life.
The fourth remark refers to the links between habit formation and parental-
based status. In related work, de la Croix and Michel (1999) analyze status-
dependent preferences in order to study the effects of inherited tastes, assuming
that the satisfaction index of a newborn agent is higher the higher is the gap
between his current consumption and the level of “aspiration” determined by the
consumption level of the parents. In the current model, this type of preferences
would take the form U(ct , et+1, nt , ct−1) = u¯(nt )+u(ct , ct−1)+βv(et+1), which
clearly differs from (5). Indeed, the phenomenon of inherited tastes is different
from—and it may be simultaneous to—that of habit formation, which refers to the
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comparison that each agent makes between his own current and past consumption
levels. It is possible to extend our model to include inherited tastes, though it
is difficult to speculate on the consequences without explicit modeling: although
aspirations would make the existence of positive bequests easier [Alonso-Carrera
et al. (2007)], the interaction between aspirations and endogenous fertility choices
is an open question that we leave for future research.
6. CONCLUSION
The recent growth literature proposes a number of explanations for (i) the low
fertility rates currently observed in developed economies and (ii) the phenomenon
known as “demographic transition.” Theoretical contributions considered fertility
choices under old-age security motives, or satisfaction-based approaches. In the
standard framework, children provide direct utility to their parents, and the demo-
graphic transition may be due to increased productivity generated by technological
progress, rising costs of child rearing, possible trade-offs between the quality
and quantity of children, and the reversal in the direction of intergenerational
transfers. In this paper, we have argued that economic development may affect
population dynamics through a different channel, i.e., the interactions between
fertility choices and habit formation in consumption. Most theoretical models
with endogenous fertility assume that consumption choices are based on standard
time-separable preferences, though a growing body of empirical evidence suggests
that preferences are status dependent in reality. Building on this point, we have
studied fertility choices and habit formation in an overlapping generations model,
assuming that the opportunity cost of having children is determined by bequests.
In this setting, habits contrast dynastic altruism through status-related effects.
Our reasoning may be linked to the empirical observation that low-reproduction
strategies have historically been intentional choices aimed at preserving the family
property and status [Johansson (1987); Haines (1992)].
A first general result is that habits reduce population growth. The reason is that,
due to habit formation, consumption choices are biased in favor of second-period
consumption, and agents aim at reducing the loss in second-period utility induced
by bequests. Being able to choose the number of children, individuals reduce
fertility in order to make parental altruism less costly. We have studied this mech-
anism under two alternative technology specifications. In the neoclassical model,
habits modify the economy’s growth rate and generate transitional dynamics in
fertility that are compatible with the phenomenon of demographic transition. In
the long run, stationary income per capita is associated with either increasing or
decreasing population and output, depending on the strength of habits. In the AK
specification, growing population and increasing consumption per capita require
that the habit coefficient lie within definite boundaries; outside the critical interval,
positive growth is associated with either declining consumption due to overcrowd-
ing or extinction paths with declining population. In both frameworks, habits are
responsible for the fertility decline, suggesting that status-dependent preferences
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may have played an important role in the demographic transition observed in
developed economies.
NOTES
1. Spain and Italy are nowadays among the countries with the lowest fertility rates in the world.
The total fertility rate fell from around 3 in 1960 to 1.2 in 2000, which is well below the replacement
level of 2.1 [Kohler, Billari, and Ortega (2002)].
2. For example, the idea that fertility declined in response to a reduction in infant mortality may
be consistent with observed dynamics in Germany and Sweden. However, in the United States and
France, reduced mortality followed fertility decline [Galor (2005)], suggesting that the contribution
of observed mortality rates to the demographic transition is limited in these cases [Mateos-Planas
(2002)].
3. The operativeness of bequests is generally linked to technological and preference parameters
according to the following logic. Because making a positive transfer to successors implies reduced
capital accumulation, agents find it optimal only if the resulting increase in utility through the altruistic
term more than compensates for the loss in second-period capital income. Hence, bequests are operative
in the equilibrium if the degree of altruism (denoted by δ in the present paper) is sufficiently high
relative to the technological parameters determining capital profitability: see, e.g., the condition derived
in de la Croix and Michel (2002, p. 253).
4. Thibault (2000) shows that, under specifications (2)–(3), the equilibrium with operative bequests:
(i) exists only if the conditions for dynamic efficiency are satisfied; and (ii) is unique. Moreover,
Thibault (2000) shows that (iii) the equilibrium with zero bequests coincides with the Diamond
(1965) equilibrium—so it can be dynamically inefficient. de la Croix and Michel (2002, Section 5.1.4)
discuss the conditions under which the equilibrium with operative bequests coincides with the modified
golden rule a` la Ramsey–Cass–Koopmans and implies policy neutrality (Ricardian equivalence). In
our analysis of the neoclassical model, we specify numerical parameters that allow the economy to be
dynamically efficient in the long run: see Section 4.2.
5. In this specification, the utility of each agent is affected by the utility of each child with a
fixed degree of altruism, δ. As the budget constraint is expressed in terms of per-child bequest, the
interpretation is that individual choices regarding the amount of per-child gifts, bt+1, are determined on
the basis of per-child utility, Wt+1. An equivalent interpretation is that parents care about the average
utility of each child, as explained in Doepke and Zilibotti (2005).
6. We choose this strategy because the aim of the present analysis is to study not the operativeness
of bequest motives but rather the interactions between habit formation and fertility rates in situations
in which bequests are operative. Operativeness is studied in detail in de la Croix and Michel (1999,
2002) and Alonso-Carrera et al. (2007) in related models with exogenous population growth.
7. In related work, de la Croix and Michel (1999) analyze status-dependent preferences in order to
study the effects of inherited tastes, which is a different phenomenon with respect to habit formation
and reflects into different specifications of first-period utility. See Section 5 on this point.
8. Result (29) is in line with the findings of Alonso-Carrera et al. (2007, Section 3), who show that
habits make the operativeness of bequests more difficult and there is a critical level of the degree of
habit formation above which agents become selfish.
9. See Figure 1. For a baseline nondegenerate value of ε = 4%, gross per-period rates of growth
of aggregate output, population, and consumption per capita, respectively, equal Yt+1/Yt = 1.2,
nss = 1.11, and ct+1/ct = 1.085. Setting ε = 6% yields an extinction path with declining population
and excessive consumption growth (nss = 0.88 and ct+1/ct = 1.36). The mirror case is obtained with
ε = 2%, associated with overcrowding (nss = 1.36 and ct+1/ct = 0.88).
10. The existence of habits (ε > 0) makes the dynamics of capital per worker dependent on the
expected interest rate, as the presence of f ′(kt+1) on the right-hand side of (50) elucidates. Hence,
kt+1 is (only) implicitly given by (50). In the absence of habits (ε = 0), equation (50) reduces to the
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familiar resource constraint
kt+1 = 1
nt
[
f (kt ) − 1
λt
(
1 + β
δ
)]
,
where kt+1 does not appear anymore in the right-hand side.
11. As habits modify the consumption propensity, the reallocation effect of habit formation rever-
berates in each period in which agents save. The consequences for consumption levels become evident
only after this “cumulative effect” on the capital stock has become quantitatively relevant. This is
why the effects of habits on consumption levels seem relatively small in the short run: in the first two
periods reported in Figure 3, the growth process is in its early stages.
12. If we drop the assumption of endogenous fertility, we obtain an OLG model with dynastic
altruism that yields predictions identical to the Ramsey model with infinite horizons, provided that
bequests are operative in each period along the equilibrium path [see de la Croix and Michel (2002,
Chapter 5)].
13. Explosive trajectories can ruled out following the standard argument. If x0 < xss , capital will
become negative in finite time, violating the aggregate constraint of the economy. If x0 > xss , capital
grows faster than consumption of the young, i.e., limt→∞(Kt+1/Kt ) > δµA > δ, but this path would
violate the transversality condition limt→∞ δtKt ≤ 0.
14. As shown in expression (47), when ε > 0, the curve gb(n∗) is bounded above by limε→0 gb(n∗).
To have an intersection ga = gb , it is thus necessary to have limε→0 gb(n∗) > 0, which in turn requires
satisfying (A.18).
15. Setting gb(0) > 0 and substituting the last term in (A.20), we obtain δ > 1−µ1−µδ , which can be
rewritten as µ(1 − δ2) > 1 − δ. Substituting 1 − δ2 = (1 − δ)(1 + δ) and rearranging terms, we obtain
expression (A.21) and therefore expression (A.22).
16. Notice that ε < 1 is a sufficient condition although it is not strictly necessary for the above
argument. In general, APb > APa is obtained whenever ε < 1+σ1−σ . We emphasize the condition ε < 1
as this is a reasonable assumption.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1. From (19), condition (17) can be written as
et+1/ct = µAβ + ε (1 + β) . (A.1)
Plugging vet+1 = (et+1 − εct )−1 into (10) and using (A.1) to substitute et+1 yields
ctλt = µA (µA + ε)−1. (A.2)
Combining (A.2) with (11) we obtain
ct+1nt = ct δµA. (A.3)
Because Ct+1/Ct = nt (ct+1/ct ), the above expression implies a constant growth rate of
aggregate consumption of the young, δµA. Moreover, substituting (A.3) in (A.1), and using
N
y
t+1 = ntNot , we obtain (23), which completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 2. Define xt ≡ Kt/Ct . Dividing both sides of (21) by Ct+1, and
using (22)–(23) to eliminate Et , we obtain
xt+1 = 1
δµ
xt − µA (β + δ) + ε (1 + β)
(δµA)2
, (A.4)
which displays a unique steady-state solution
xss = µA (β + δ) + ε (1 + β)
(1 − δµ) δµA2 . (A.5)
For a given K0, the initial condition x0 is determined by the jump-variable C0. Because
δµ < 1, the steady state is unstable and all the trajectories starting from x0 	= xss are
explosive and nonoptimal.13 Hence, variable x jumps at the steady-state level xss at time
zero and is constant thereafter. From Lemma 1 and constraint (21), xt = xss at each t
implies balanced growth from time zero onward in aggregate variables, with Kt , Yt , Ct ,
and Et all growing at the constant rate δµA. Because Kt/Ct = xss , we have Yt/Ct =
(AKt/Ct )
−1 = (Axss)−1, which implies (24) after substituting (A.5). 
Derivation of (26). Substituting rt+1 = µA and (17) in (6) yields
bt+1 = µA
nt
[
wt + bt − ct (µA + ε) (1 + β)
µA
]
.
Dividing both sides by ct+1 and using (A.3), we have
zt+1 = 1
δ
[
wt
ct
+ zt − (µA + ε) (1 + β)
µA
]
. (A.6)
Because wt/ct = (1 − µ) (Yt/Ct ), the first term in brackets equals (1 − µ)ψ−1, implying
equation (26) in the text.
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S136510051000009X
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 15:18:48, subject to the Cambridge Core
392 ANDREAS SCHA¨FER AND SIMONE VALENTE
Proof of Proposition 1. From (16), plugging u¯nt = γ σnσ−1t into the first-order condi-
tion (13) gives λtbt+1 = γ σµAnσ−1t . Substituting expressions (A.1) and (A.3), we obtain
bt+1
ct+1
= γ σ (µA + ε)
δµA
nσt . (A.7)
Because bt+1 = zssct+1 in each period, expression (A.7) implies (30). Because ∂zss/∂ε < 0,
it follows from (30) that ∂nss/∂ε < 0. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Because the growth rate of aggregate output Yt+1/Yt = δµA
is independent of habit formation, the nonambiguous sign of the derivative ∂nss/∂ε < 0
implies that there generally exist a couple of critical levels ε′ and ε′′, with ε′ < ε′′, such
that ε = ε′ implies nss = δµA > 1, and ε = ε′′ implies nss = 1. For reasonable
parameter values, both ε′ and ε′′ are strictly positive, implying cases (i), (ii), and (iii)—see
Figure 1. 
Derivation of (36)–(37). Equation (37) is obtained as follows. Substituting vet+1 =
(et+1 − εct )−1 in (10) we obtain βnt = δλt+1(et+1 − εct ). Substituting δλt+1 = λtnt r−1t+1
from (11) we thus have βrt+1 = λt (et+1 − εct ). Substituting et+1 = ct [βrt+1 + ε(1 + β)]
from (17), we obtain
β
ct [βrt+1 + ε (1 + β)] − εct =
λt
rt+1
,
which reduces to (37) after rearranging terms and substituting rt+1 = f ′(kt+1). Equation
(36) is obtained as follows. From (34) it follows that
ct + et+1
rt+1
= ct + ct [βrt+1 + ε (1 + β)]
rt+1
= ct (1 + β)
(
rt+1 + ε
rt+1
)
. (A.8)
Substituting (A.8) in (6), we obtain
bt+1 = rt+1
nt
(wt + bt ) − ct (1 + β)
(
rt+1 + ε
nt
)
. (A.9)
Now rewrite condition (35) as
bt+1 = unt
λt
rt+1 and bt =
unt−1
λt−1
rt , (A.10)
and combine (A.10) with (A.9) to get
unt = λt
1
nt
(
wt +
unt−1
λt−1
rt
)
− λtct (1 + β) 1
nt
(
rt+1 + ε
rt+1
)
. (A.11)
Substituting (37) in (A.11) yields
unt nt = λtwt + unt−1
λt
λt−1
rt − (1 + β) , (A.12)
and, substituting λt
λt−1 rt =
nt−1
δ
, we obtain
unt nt = unt−1nt−1
1
δ
+ λtwt − (1 + β) .
Substituting wt = (1 − µ) f (kt ) and unt nt = σγ nσt we obtain expression (36).
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Derivation of (44)–(45). Using (39) to substitute e∗ in (38), and using (42) to substitute
c∗ in the resulting expression, we have
n∗k∗ = f (k∗) −
(
1
λ∗
)
f ′ (k∗)
f ′ (k∗) + ε
[
n∗ + βf ′ (k∗) + ε (1 + β)
n∗
]
. (A.13)
Because f ′ (k∗) = µHkµ−1∗ , condition (40) implies f ′(k∗) = n∗/δ and k∗ = (µHδ/n∗)
1
1−µ
.
Substituting these results in (A.13) and solving for λ, we obtain
λ∗ = n∗ + n∗ (β/δ) + ε (1 + β)
n∗ + εδ
[
H
(
µHδ
n∗
) µ
1−µ
− n∗
(
µHδ
n∗
) 1
1−µ
]−1
. (A.14)
From (41) we have
nσ∗ =
(
δ
1 − δ
)
1
σγ
[(1 + β) − (1 − µ) f (k∗) λ∗] ,
where we can substitute (A.14) and f (k∗) = H(µHδ/n∗)
µ
1−µ to obtain
nσ∗ =
δ (1 + β)
σγ (1 − δ) −
(1 − µ)
σγ (1 − δ) (1 − µδ)
[
n∗ (δ + β) + εδ (1 + β)
n∗ + δε
]
. (A.15)
Defining ga(n∗) = nσ∗ and gb(n∗) as the right-hand side of (A.15), this equilibrium condition
can be rewritten as ga(n∗) = gb (n∗).
Proof of Proposition 3. Expression (45) implies
lim
ε→0
gb (n∗) = δ (1 + β)
σγ (1 − δ) −
(1 − µ) (δ + β)
σγ (1 − δ) (1 − µδ) , (A.16)
As ε → 0, gb(n∗) becomes independent of n∗ and reduces to a horizontal line in the gi −n∗
plane. Because 0 < σ < 1, the function ga(n∗) = nσ∗ is strictly increasing in the gi − n∗
plane and satisfies ga(0) = 0. This implies that only one value n∗ > 0 may satisfy the
equilibrium condition ga = gb (see Figure 2). Imposing (43) we obtain
n∗ =
{
1
σγ (1 − δ)
[
δ (1 + β) − (1 − µ) (δ + β)
(1 − µδ)
]}1/σ
. (A.17)
The term in square brackets implies that there exists a unique well-defined equilibrium
when parameters satisfy
δ (1 + β)
δ + β >
1 − µ
1 − µδ . (A.18)
When (A.18) is violated, there is no well-defined equilibrium, because the right-hand side
of (A.16) is negative. The unique equilibrium is feasible if and only if the right-hand side
of (A.17) is greater than δ. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Notice that, when ε > 0, the existence of an equilibrium is
linked to the case of inactive habits: in order to have an equilibrium it is necessary that
(A.18) is satisfied.14 As regards the characteristics of candidate equilibria, the reasoning is
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as follows. As shown in the main text, both ga(n∗) and gb(n∗) are strictly increasing and
concave in n∗ for any ε > 0. The vertical intercepts are
ga (0) = lim
n∗→0
ga (n∗) = 0, (A.19)
gb (0) = lim
n∗→0
gb (n∗) = δ (1 + β)
σγ (1 − δ) −
(1 − µ) (1 + β)
σγ (1 − δ) (1 − µδ) . (A.20)
Expression (A.20) implies that15
µ > (1 + δ)−1 =⇒ gb (0) > ga (0) = 0, (A.21)
µ < (1 + δ)−1 =⇒ gb (0) < ga (0) = 0. (A.22)
Case (A.21) is characterized by the fact that the vertical intercept of gb is higher than
ga(0) = 0. Case (A.22) is characterized by the fact that the vertical intercept of gb is lower
than ga(0) = 0. The issue of the number of intersections can be addressed by comparing
the curvature of the two functions as captured by the Arrow–Pratt coefficients (APa and
APb), respectively, equal to
APa = −g
a (n∗)′′ n∗
ga (n∗)′
= 1 − σ, (A.23)
APb = −g
b (n∗)′′ n∗
gb (n∗)′
= 2n∗
n∗ + δε . (A.24)
While APa is constant, positive, and smaller than unity, expression (A.24) implies
∂APb
∂n∗
= 2δε
(n∗ + δε)2
> 0, (A.25)
lim
n∗→0
APb = 0 < APa, (A.26)
lim
n∗→∞
APb = 2 > APa, (A.27)
Expressions (A.25)–(A.27) imply that the curvature of gb(n∗) falls short of that of ga(n∗) in
the origin and then monotonically increases, eventually exceeding that of ga(n∗) for higher
values of n∗. This implies the following results:
(a) Suppose that µ > (1 + δ)−1. From (A.21) we have gb(0) > ga(0). Given this,
expressions (A.25)–(A.27) imply that the condition ga = gb can be satisfied only by
a unique intersection where gb(n∗) cuts ga(n∗) from above, as shown in Figure 2 (a).
This intersection characterizes a feasible equilibrium provided that parameters imply
n∗ > δ.
(b) Suppose that µ < (1 + δ)−1. From (A.21) we have gb(0) < ga(0), and expressions
(A.25)–(A.27) imply that the condition ga = gb can be satisfied by two intersections,
n′ > 0 and n′′ > 0, with n′ < n′′. As shown in Figure 2(b), the “high” intersection
n′′ has the same properties as the unique equilibrium arising in diagram (a): ga = gb
is satisfied with gb(n∗) cutting ga(n∗) from above; the “low” intersection n′, instead,
satisfies the condition ga = gb with gb(n∗) cutting ga(n∗) from below.
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Given cases (a) and (b), if we can rule out n′ as unfeasible, we obtain the proof that the
steady-state equilibrium of the economy is unique and is characterized by an intersection
in which gb(n∗) cuts ga(n∗) from above. The proof is as follows. Suppose that parameters
are such that ga = gb is satisfied with n∗ = δ. From (A.24), this intersection would be
characterized by
n∗ = δ =⇒ APb = 21 + ε . (A.28)
From (A.23) and (A.28), it follows that, for any ε < 1, we have APb > APa .16 That is, an
intersection ga = gb with n∗ = δ can only be satisfied with gb(n∗) cutting ga(n∗) from
above. This reasoning can be repeated for any intersection in which n∗ > δ: because APb is
increasing in n∗ while APa is fixed, any intersection ga = gb with n∗ > δ is characterized by
gb(n∗) cutting ga(n∗) from above. It follows from this result that the candidate equilibrium
n′ that arises in case (b) with gb(n∗) cutting ga(n∗) from below is necessarily characterized
by n′ < δ, and this is not a feasible equilibrium. The conclusion is that, irrespective of
whether we are in case (a) or in case (b), there may exist only one feasible steady state with
n∗ > δ, and this equilibrium is represented by an intersection in which gb(n∗) cuts ga(n∗)
from above. 
Proof of Lemma 3. If nmax > 1, there exists a critical value of habit formation εδ > 0
for which we obtain an equilibrium n∗ = δ. Being gb(n∗; ε) strictly declining in ε, well-
defined equilibria are characterized by values of ε lying in the interval 0 ≤ ε < εδ . Because
δ < 1, the equilibrium n∗ = 1 is feasible, i.e., it lies in the interior of the relevant region;
see Figure 2. Because ∂gb/∂ε < 0, the equilibrium n∗ = 1 is associated with a critical
value of the habit coefficient ε¯ such that 0 < ε¯ < εδ . As a consequence, there exists a subset
of well-defined equilibria associated with growing population (characterized by 0 < ε < ε¯
and n∗ > 1) and another subset associated with declining population (characterized by
ε¯ < ε < εδ and n∗ < 1). 
Proof of Proposition 5. From Lemma 3, if ε falls in the intervals mentioned in cases
(i), (ii), and (iii), we respectively have increasing, decreasing, and constant population. The
proof is completed by recalling that Yt+1/Yt = n∗ holds in the steady-state by virtue of
(49). 
Derivation of (50)–(52). Equations (51)–(52) directly follow from (35)–(36). Equation
(50) can be obtained as follows. Rewriting (52) at time t and substituting λt = rt+1[ct (rt+1+
ε)]−1 from (37), we get
λt−1ct = δrt+1rt
nt−1 (rt+1 + ε) . (A.29)
Substituting λt−1 = rt [ct−1(rt + ε)]−1 from (37) and et = ct−1[βrt + ε(1 + β)] from (17),
we have
et
nt−1
= ct (rt+1 + ε) [βrt + ε (1 + β)]
δrt+1 (rt + ε) . (A.30)
Plugging (A.30) in (33), and substituting (37) to eliminate ct , we obtain
ntkt+1 = f (kt ) − f
′ (kt+1)
λt (f ′ (kt+1) + ε)
{
1 + (f
′ (kt+1) + ε) [βf ′ (kt ) + ε (1 + β)]
δf ′ (kt+1) (f ′ (kt ) + ε)
}
,
(A.31)
which implies (50) in the text.
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Simulation Method. Backward iteration requires us to determine an initial value to
evaluate the time-reversed system up to a termination criterion and to revert the obtained
sequence of solutions. Because the analytical selection of an initial value on the stable
manifold is generally not available, the initial value is given by a point in the neighborhood
of the steady state. A good approximation is obtained by making use of the stable eigenvector
of the Jacobian J∗ which is tangent to the saddle path at the stationary solution (k∗, λ∗, n∗).
We thus set ∣∣∣∣∣∣
k0
λ0
n0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
k∗
λ∗
n∗
∣∣∣∣∣∣+ didd,
where di represents the initial deviation from the equilibrium and dd defines the direction.
The initial values (k0, λ0, n0) are set equal to (kt+1, λt+1, nt+1), and the system (50)–(52)
is solved backward for (kt , λt , nt ), and so on. In the simulation, the approximations of
the linearized system proved to be a good first guess for the solution of the system. The
linearized system is ∣∣∣∣∣∣
kt
λt
nt
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = P
∣∣∣∣∣∣
A1 ν
t
1
A2 ν
t
2
A3 ν
t
3
∣∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
k∗
λ∗
n∗
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ,
where P contains the eigenvectors p1, p2, p3 and A1, A2, A3 represent arbitrary constants.
Because ν1, ν2 > 1, it follows immediately that A1 = A2 = 0, such that
kt = p3,1A3νt3 + k∗,
λt = p3,2A3νt3 + λ∗,
nt = p3,3A3νt3 + n∗.
Because k0 is given, A3 is obtained as k0−k∗e3,1 = A3.
Proof of Proposition 6. Multiplying both terms of (50) by λt+1 and substituting (51),
we obtain
δλt+1kt+1f ′(kt+1) = λtf (kt ) − f
′(kt+1)
f ′(kt+1) + ε −
βf ′(kt+1) + ε(1 + β)
δ(f ′(kt+1) + ε) . (A.32)
Because f ′(kt+1) = rt+1 and kt+1f ′(kt+1) = µf (kt+1), we can define the shadow value of
output per capita as Qt ≡ λtyt = λtf (kt ) and rewrite (A.32) as
Qt+1 = 1
µδ
[
Qt − rt+1
rt+1 + ε −
βrt+1 + ε(1 + β)
δ(rt+1 + ε)
]
. (A.33)
If ε = 0, this expression reduces to
Qt+1 = 1
µδ
(
Qt − β + δ
δ
)
, (A.34)
which displays a unique steady-state Qss = β+δδ(1−µδ) . Because µδ < 1, this steady state
is unstable, and explosive paths can be ruled out as suboptimal: if limt→∞ Qt = −∞,
capital per worker must become negative in finite time, whereas limt→∞ Qt = +∞ would
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violate the transversality condition limt→∞ λtkt = 0. Hence, when habits are inactive, the
shadow value of output per capita jumps at Qss at time zero and stays there forever [this
result is intuitive, because (37) implies that, when ε = 0, the shadow value of first-period
consumption is constant and equal to unity at each point in time]. The fact that Qt = Qss
in each t implies that fertility rates exhibit no transition. To see this, rewrite (36) as
nσt+1 =
1
δ
nσt +
1
σγ
[(1 − µ)Qt+1 − (1 + β)] . (A.35)
If ε = 0 we have Qt+1 = Qss , and (A.35) displays an unstable steady state in fertility
rates. Ruling out explosive paths that would make nt diverge to plus/minus infinity, the
only possible equilibrium with inactive habits is characterized by Qt = Qss and nt = nmax
at each point in time, which completes the proof. 
Derivation of (53). From (35) and (37)
ct+1
ct
= δ (rt+1 + ε) rt+2
nt (rt+2 + ε) .
Using (34) to substitute ct , and rearranging terms, we have
ct+1
et+1
= δ (rt+1 + ε) rt+2
nt (rt+2 + ε) [βrt+1 + ε (1 + β)] .
Multiplying both sides by Nyt+1/Not+1, and recalling that Not+1 = Nyt , we have
Ct+1
Et+1
= δ (rt+1 + ε) rt+2
(rt+2 + ε) [βrt+1 + ε (1 + β)] ,
which implies (53) in the text.
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